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A reasonable expectation of a fully-fledged theory of reference in
natural language would be that it provide at least a basis for determining,
in any particular occurrence of a referring expression, a name or descrip-
tion, what function that referring expression is being used to perform.
No theory is able to determine whether (1) is true or false, even given
the truth of (2) and (3).
(1) Oedipus wanted to marry his mother.
(2) Oedipus wanted to marry Jocasta.
(3) Jocasta was the mother of Oedipus.
Now the reason that no theory can determine whether (1) is entailed
by the conjunction of (2) and (3) is that the description "his mother" in
(1) occurs in a referentially opaque context. However, giving such a
reason is not the same thing as giving an adequate theoretical account,
for such an account should make clear why the reason counts as a reason.
Two conclusions could be drawn from the problem that referential
opacity poses for referential theory. The first is that the available
semantic theories are simply wrong, and we must merely await a better one.
The second is that questions of reference, apparently purely semantic
questions, cannot be answered by a purely semantic theory but need to be
supported by aspects of a theory of pragmatics.
The arguments presented below attempt to support the second of these
conclusions. Thus while Kripke objects to Donnellan's claims3 based on
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a distinction between referential and attributive uses of definite descrip-
tion because he suspects "they have little to do with semantics or truth
conditions, though they may be relevant to a theory of speech acts," the
claims to be pressed here are that it is precisely because of their rele-
vance to a theory of speech acts that they are relevant to a semantic
theory of reference.
In spite of Kripke's inclincation to reject Donnellan's distinction,
he believes that it can be extended to proper names, and in doing so, it
could be argued, he lays the groundwork for a solution to some of the
problems. Kripke's problem with associating a name with a referential use
of a description is that if the description turns out not to apply to its
object it is typically withdrawn. But all we need say to this objection
is that in fact it was not a referential use of a description of that
object (but possibly of some other object).
We can explore further the extension of the attributive/referential dis-
tinction to names. In order for a name to be systematically and success-
fully used it need only denote the entity it does in the language. Thus the
prima facie use of a name is referential. It would, in principle, be per-
fectly possible for two native speakers of a language to communicate about a
named entity without having any previously shared knowledge about that entity--
if this were not the case it would be impossible to learn anything by first in-
troducing a name and then predicating things of the named entity. This view
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clearly rejects the "principle of identifying descriptions, for it allows
that a speaker may use a name and have only "vacuous" descriptions to "back
it up," as when a child might ask "Who is Ralph Nader," having only a des-
cription such as "Someone whose name I have heard."
Indeed, it would seem that the only description which is necessary for
the successful and appropriate use of a name is something like "the entity
(I believe to be) conventionally referred to as "x" (in my language culture),"
and this could hardly be regarded as knowing who or what is referred to in
any important, epistemic, sense.
What of definite descriptions? If the prima facie job of names is
referential why should the prima facie job of definite descriptions not be
attributive. What would it mean to make such a claim? By parallel argument
to the case of proper names, one thing it would mean would be that the
epistemic prerequisites for the successful and appropriate attributive use
of a definite description should be minimal. In the case of a name, the
minimal requirement appeared to be the speaker's intention to refer to the
entity believed to be conventionally referred to by the name. In the case
of the attributive use of a definite description it would be something like
the speaker's intention to indicate the attribute(s) implicit in the definite
description. No other knowledge would be necessary; the question of the
name of any entity possessing that attribute would be as irrelevant as would
be knowledge of other attributes such an entity might possess.
Just as names bear a special direct relationship to the entities they
denote, so attributive definite descriptions bear a special direct relation-
ship to the attribute(s) they invoke. A definite description can often be direct-
ly derived from a predicate (or conjunction of predicates) by the application
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of syntactic rules. We will call the predicate(s) from which a definite
description is derived the "source predicate." An attributive definite
description is derived from a predicate without regard to the entity of
which that predicate is (or has been) predicated. Adding credence to this
view is the fact that any definite description used attributively can be
eliminated and replaced by an occurrence of the predicate bound by a uni-
versal quantifier in a hypothetical statement. Consider a modification
of Donnellan's5 example (4):
(4) The winner of the Indianapolis 500 will drive a turbine.
This can be re-written as (5):
(5) (x)(x wins the Indianapolis 500 = x drives a turbine)
which would be true even if there were no instantiation for x. Consequently,
(5) can be construed as being a relation between two predicates, the first
of which was transformed into a definite description in (4). There is there-
fore no reason to believe that (4) refers to an entity at all--it merely
asserts a relationship between the predicates.
Let us say, then, that names are prima facie referential, and definite
description prima facie attributive, and let us use the terminology "direct
uses" for such expressions. We have, then, two types of linguistic entity,
names and descriptions, whose primary functions are distinct. But, under
certain circumstances, each of these linguistic entities can be used to
perform the functions which are basic to the other. These uses we will
call "indirect uses." The reason for this is partly terminologically sym-
metry and partly due to the fact that the epistemic prerequisites are greater
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than for direct uses. For, to use a definite description indirectly, that
is referentially, it is no longer possible to disregard the entity of which
the source predicate is predicated for that entity is now being indirectly
referred to through the predicate. In principle, it could have been directly
referred to using its name. Similarly, a proper name can be used as an
indirect means of using an attributive definite description. To show this
we can reverse Kripke's objection to extending Donnellan's distinction.
Two men glimpse someone at a distance raking leaves and one, thinking it to
be Jones, says "Jones is doing a good leaf-raking job." The second man
informs the first that actually it isn't Jones at all, but it is Jones' son.
To misquote Kripke we can say: "an attributive proper name, such as 'Jones',
is typically withdrawn when the speaker realizes that it is not the name of
its object." All this shows is that the speaker's concern was not with
Jones at all but with "the person raking the leaves, whoever he is," and
that, of course, is exactly how Donnellan characterizes an attributive use.
The reason one can withdraw the name (or in the earlier case, the descrip-
tion) is that we don't care, in indirect uses, whether the description or
name fits, for in such cases when we use the description we do so for the
purpose of referring, and when we use the name we do so for the purpose of
expressing a relationship between predicates.
Let us now summarize our claims so far. Direct uses of names and
Indirect uses of descriptions are referential. Direct uses of descriptions
and Indirect uses of names are attributive. In the absence of any special
assumptions about context we can reconsider (1) and (2) to see these distinc-
tions working. Given our normal assumptions about Oedipus and his sexual
ambitions (1) is true if "his mother" is an Indirect use of a description
- 6 -
and false if it is a Direct use of a description. Similarly, (2) is true
if "Jocasta" is a Direct use of a name and false if it is an Indirect use
of a name. The reason we need a pragmatic account is that such "ceteris
paribus" assumptions about context are frequently unsatisfiable. There are
pragmatic and stylistic reasons why indirect uses are sometimes necessary.
We do, however, have the beginnings of an account of the truth conditions
for sentences like (1) and (2). The addition of more pragmatic considera-
tions may enable us to at least make good guesses, if not actually to decide,
what function referring expressions are performing in particular cases.
II
Indirect uses of names and descriptions are the ones that are of chief
concern in our pragmatic analysis. The simpler of the two cases is that of
the indirect use of a name. If a speaker uses a name indirectly, that is,
to perform the function of an attributive definite description, he must not
only believe that the source predicate of the description is true of the
individual whose name he uses, he must also believe that the hearer shares
that belief and that the hearer will have some cause to select the particular
implied predicate(s) from what may be a very long list of predicates he has
associated with the individual. In normal conversation a speaker only uses
a name indirectly if one of two conditions has been satisfied:
(i) The context has already established the attributive definite
description, or a narrow range of possible ones.
(ii) There exists some particularly favored definite description
for the named entity.
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If one of these conditions is not satisfied the addressee is likely to ask
for an explanation; he is likely to ask how or why the assertion is (supposed
to be) true.
Consider the example (6):
(6) Alfred Nobel profoundly influenced the nature of warfare.
Unless one can assume, as a speaker, that the addressee knows that Nobel
invented dynamite, and that the inventing of dynamite is contextually rele-
vant, it is unlikely that one would initiate a new topic of conversation
using (6) unless the name were being used directly. If the name is used
indirectly, it is being used to perform the function of an attributive
description as in (7):
(7) The inventor of dynamite profoundly influenced the nature
of warfare.
If one's addressee were to respond "how?" to (6) the kind of answer one
would give would be in terms of Nobel's invention of dynamite. That is,
one would have to supply the source predicate associated with Nobel. Such
a question asked of (7), however, would not call for a response such as
"Nobel invented dynamite" but might call for a missing predicate associated
with dynamite and relating it to warfare. The difference between the
indirect use in (6) and the direct use in (7) is that the semantic proximity
in (7) between the definite description and the predicate is much more
direct and apparent than it is between the name and the predicate in (6).
Barbara Hall Partee makes a similar point when she says referential inter-
pretations tend to lack a "strong semantic relation to the content of the
rest of the sentence."
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Some names refer to entities for which there are favored or preferred
descriptions. Examples are easy to find--"George Washington" and "the first
president of the United States," "Gerald Ford" and "the (current) president
(of the United States)," "Paris" and "the Capital of France" and so on.
Because of this fact condition (ii) above may be satisfied and consequently
(8)
(8) George Washington signed a treaty with France
can be used to initiate a new topic of conversation without having previ-
ously established which attribute of George Washington is to be selected
from the many candidates.
A name, then, when used indirectly can be regarded as fulfilling the
function of an attributive description. In such a case a name really is a
8
kind of abbreviation for a description as Russell suggested, and the
speaker normally presupposes that his addressee knows for which description
it is standing in.
Definite descriptions used referentially, that is, indirect uses,
serve a particularly important function in language, namely that of re-
ferring to entities for which either there is no (unique) name, or for
which the speaker either does not know the name, or knows that the hearer
doesn't. If we are right that the prima facie use of definite descriptions
is attributive, then it would follow that in the absence of contrary indica-
tions, on encountering a definite description a hearer would attempt to
relate the implied predicate, that is, its sense, to the rest of the
sentence in which it occurred. If he fails to find a "semantic connection"
he may then decide that the expression is being used referentially. As an
example consider (9):
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(9) The President who signed a treaty with France sometimes
annoyed his father.
A hearer, on deciding that the sense of the definite description bore no
apparent relationship to the rest of the sentence, might be inclined then
to treat the description as being an indirect use. He might also, justi-
fiably, inquire "What has being a president who signed a treaty with France
got to do with annoying one's father?", for the selection of any particular
description to refer to an individual always carries with it the question
as to why that particular description was selected. So, for a speaker to
use a definite description indirectly we can suppose one, or more, of the
following conditions must be satisfied:
(i) The speaker does not know the name of the referent, and/or
believes that his addressee doesn't.
(ii) The referent has no (sufficiently unique) name.
(iii) The speaker believes that the definite description he uses
is derived from a source predicate which he and his addressee
believe to be true of the referent.
If none of these conditions is satisfied, or if the addressee believes none
of them to be, the addressee will probably fail to understand. Thus, if
the addressee did not know that the referent of the definite description in
(9) was George Washington he might respond to it by saying "Who was that?"
On being told he might understandably complain "If you meant George Washing-
ton, why didn't you say so" and the speaker's only justification (assuming
he knew George Washington's name, and knew the speaker knew it) would be to
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say "I thought you knew that it was George Washington who signed a treaty
with France." Another way of putting all this is to say that if a speaker
wishes to "pick out" an individual, using the name of that individual is
usually the best way! To arbitrarily use some other form is to run the
risk of either communicating the wrong thing, or failing to communicate at
all. One might say that Grice's maxim, "be perspicuous," should contain
as a submaxim "be direct."
One other reason that speakers employ indirect uses is purely stylistic.
It is cumbersome and inelegant to repeatedly utilize the same expression,
be it name or description. However, indirect uses employed for stylistic
reasons alone usually satisfy the conditions we have laid out above because
they generally follow their corresponding direct uses.
III
If the analysis so far is correct it would seem that all occurrences
of names and descriptions are open to direct or indirect interpretation,
at least in principle. The ideal goal would be a rule which would enable,
in any particular case, a determination of which interpretation is to be
made. While the ideal goal is almost certainly unattainable, a less ambi-
tious heuristic rule might be possible.
We have suggested so far that there is usually a reason for a speaker
to use an indirect form in preference to a direct one. It may be lack of
knowledge on his part, a belief in a lack of knowledge of his addressee, or
the presence of clear contextual clues as to the fact that the use is,
indeed, indirect. The problem of formulating a rule to determine whether a
use is direct or indirect is that the only datum available is the sentence,
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and without knowledge concerning the circumstances of its use there is no
way of reconstructing the speaker's intentions. Nevertheless, a good first
approximation is to suppose that all uses are direct. (This will obviously
fail in all cases where reference is made to a nameless entity, but it is
only a first approximation.) Using this first approximation, let us con-
sider some examples. Take an identity statement such as (10):
(10) Nixon was the 37th President of the U.S.
Both the name and the definite description are best interpreted as being
direct uses. Since a direct use of a definite description merely identifies
a predicate and since different predicates (typically) have different truth
conditions the replacement of the definite description by another will not
only change the meaning but will also have different truth conditions.
Thus (11) while still true is true for different reasons,
(11) Nixon was the winner of the 1972 presidential election.
for had someone else won the 1972 election that person would have been the
38th president.
What happens when an identity statement appears in a referentially
opaque context such as (12)?
(12) George IV wished to know if Scott was the author of Waverly.
Again, within the identity statement we have two direct uses, but, as we
know, substitution in such contexts may change the truth value.
Consider the following corollary of our first approximation rule:
Substitutions may not be made for direct uses. The penalty for violating
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this rule would be an inability to guarantee the truth value and/or modality
of the sentence. Thus substituting "Nixon" for "The 37th President" in
(10) yields (13),
(13) Nixon was (is) Nixon.
the modality of which is different from that of (10), and, as Russell pointed
10
out, presumably it is false that George IV wished to know if Scott was Scott.
At least part of the problem with referentially opaque contexts is that
the pragmatic considerations which might lead to determining whether a use
is direct or indirect are not only undetectable from the sentence alone but
depend on whether these considerations were exercised by the speaker or by
the referent of whom he speaks. Thus to return to the first example (1)
if the use of "his mother" is from the point of view of the speaker then
there is no reason to include the phrase within the scope of the wants of
Oedipus, whereas if it is from that of Oedipus there is. So, in such con-
texts we have the problem, not only of determining whether the use is direct
or indirect, but also of determining whose use it is. Should we read (1)
as (la) or (lb)?
(la) Oedipus wanted {marry } . mother of Oedipus,
(lb) Oedipus wanted {marrya . mother of Oedipus }
This ambiguity accentuates the fact that sentences are used by speakers in
the performance of speech acts and that the speech acts are better units of
analysis than the sentences used to perform them.
Let us nevertheless, persevere. If in a use of (1) "his mother" is direct
(1) is false and by our rule substitution is not possible. On the other hand,
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if the use is indirect, (1) is true and substitution is possible, provided
that the substitution is with the corresponding direct use. But we have
said that we should suppose the use to be direct. What could lead to the
alternative interpretation? One possibility is that the direct interpreta-
tion results in a false sentence and given a choice of interpretations of a
sentence a hearer will generally attempt to interpret it as being true.
This would suggest that a maxim such as Grice's "try to make your contribu-
tion one which is true" might be a higher-level constraint on a hearer's
interpretation of an utterance than what we earlier suggested might be a
submaxim "be direct." So, a hearer's first assumption is that what he is
being told is true. Only then does he assume that the speaker is being
direct. If there is a conflict he gives up the latter constraint in prefer-
ence to the former.
Our conclusions then are these: (1) Unless there is evidence to suggest
that the conditions for an indirect use have been satisfied, a good rule is
to assume the use is direct. (2) If this assumption produces a false sen-
tence while the assumption of an indirect use produces a true one, treat the
use as indirect. (3) Substitutions may be made in all contexts provided
that they are only in the direction of indirect uses being replaced by their
corresponding direct uses. (4) If substitutions are made from (a) direct
uses to other direct uses, or (b) from direct uses to indirect uses, or
(c) from indirect uses to other indirect uses, the preservation of truth
value and/or modality cannot be guaranteed.
At the beginning of this paper it was suggested that perhaps some ques-
tions about reference cannot be answered by a purely semantic theory. Such
theories either break down or become very cumbersome in the face of referentially
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opaque contexts. Characterizing such contexts independently of the notion
of interchangeability salva veritate appears to be a very difficult thing
to do. The whole problem seems incomprehensible to, say, a psycholinguist.
Why should it be?
Consider the sentence (14):
(14) John kicked the ball.
To be sure, if the referent of "John" stays unchanged the sentence remains
true even though some other phrase may be substituted for "John." As far
as truth conditions are concerned what matters is that the objects referred
to are indeed referred to. What some logician appears to want, however, is
that we should be able to guarantee the continued truth of some sentences
even when these "objects" change. The reluctance to admit that meaning is
a determinant of truth leads to absurdities. Everyone can believe that
George IV wished to know whether Scott was the author of Waverly, but, the
psycholinguist will be inclined to argue, the object of George IV's concern
was the truth of a particular proposition. That proposition was "Scott is
the author of Waverly"--not some other, related proposition. The only
alternative proposition of concern to George IV would have been a proposition
which had the same meaning. If one were to suppose that the "object"--i.e.
the referent, were to remain fixed and if one were to suppose, as did
Frege, that the referent of a sentence were its truth value, then one
could see how, if we change the occurrence of "the author of Waverly" for
"Scott" we still have a linguistic expression having the same referent
(namely "True") and consequently by analogy with (14), substitution salva
veritate should be possible.
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But whatever the referent of a sentence is, such an analysis is simply
wrong. George IV wanted to know whether that particular proposition was
true, not whether some other one was. If we allow substitution we change
the meaning if not the truth value of the embedded sentence and we may thus
produce a proposition which ceases to represent the "object" of George IV's
inquiry. We have argued that a direct use of a description bears a special
relationship to a predicate--a meaningful entity. If that predicate is
replaced or lost so may the meaning. Consequently we might suppose that
the only way one can guarantee interchangeability salva veritate in refer-
entially opaque contexts is if we also guarantee interchangeability salva
significatione. This is why indirect uses of descriptions may be replaced
by their corresponding direct ones, for in their indirect uses their
reference is being exploited, rather than their sense. But, in the last
analysis, the only way to determine how an expression is being used in a
sentence is through a pragmatic analysis; a purely semantic analysis can
never work.
12
I have argued elsewhere2 that theories about language must eventually
take account of people, of what they say, and why they say it. In this
spirit, it is interesting to note that people do confuse names for descrip-
13
tions and descriptions for names. In an experimental investigation3
designed to determine whether there was any psychological counterpart to
the direct/indirect distinction, subjects were exposed to direct and in-
direct uses of many names and corresponding descriptions occurring in sen-
tences administered in an incidental learning task. Thus at some point
during learning a subject would see both of either (15) and (16), or (17)
and (18).
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(15) Abraham Lincoln lived in Illinois.
(16) The president who freed the slaves was politically astute.
(17) Abraham Lincoln was politcally astute.
(18) The president'who freed the slaves lived in Illinois.
In (15) the name is best regarded as being a direct use as is the description
in (16), whereas in (17) the name is more naturally interpreted as being an
indirect use as is the description in (18). When subjects were later given
a recognition test in which all four sentences somewhere appeared, there was
a marked and highly significant tendency for them to falsely recognize
direct uses (that they had never seen) and to incorrectly reject indirect
uses (that they had seen). One of the conclusions of the study was that
people may in fact sometimes spontaneously substitute direct uses for in-
direct ones, but that these substitutions are not normally made in the other
direction.
What we have then, is a rule governing substitution in both referen-
tially transparent and referentially opaque contexts. The rule guarantees
the preservation of modality in the former and truth value in the latter
and for that reason it can be regarded as a semantic rule. However, the
application of the rule cannot be made without taking pragmatic considera-
tions into account, for it is only a pragmatic analysis that can reveal that
the use of an expression is in fact an indirect use thus permitting the
substitution of the corresponding direct expression.
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IV
The analysis of names and descriptions is a traditional pastime of
twentieth century philosophers. From the point of view of the linguist,
however, the distinction may be rather artificial. The reason for this is
that all the problems which have traditionally been handled under the
rubric of proper names and definite descriptions, appear to apply just as
much to linguistic entities which philosophers would be reluctant to call
proper names, and to entities they would be reluctant to call definite
descriptions. Complicating the issue is the fact that some linguistic
expressions appear to behave sometimes like names and sometimes like des-
criptions. Expressions of which this is true are not just the obvious cases
of "hybrids" such as "The Holy Roman Empire" which philosophers generally
agree is a proper name, but more complicated expressions such as those
referring to mass, length and time.
At least part of the problem is due to the fact that the terms "proper
name" and "definite description" are not well defined. Most philosophers
seem to accept Russell's characterization of a definite description as being
a phrase of the form "the so-and-so." Yet, "The Holy Roman Empire" has just
that form but it is regarded as a name, just as is the phrase "The United
States of America." Dates, however, are particularly complicated. Uttered
at the appropriate time (19) might well be true:
(19) We hid Easter eggs last Sunday.
Now the phrase "last Sunday" is clearly indirect, because, uttered a week
later (19) could well be false 14 But, if we substitute a direct use what do
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we put in? We could put in "Sunday, March 30th 1975," or, "Easter Sunday
(1975)." The best candidate would appear to be the latter, but is "Easter
Sunday, 1975" a description or a name. The answer would appear to be that
it is a name with respect to the phrase "last Sunday" or the phrase "the
first Sunday after the full moon on or next after the vernal equinox in 1975."
But with respect to the phrase "Sunday, March 30th 1975" it appears to be a
description. This suggests that it is possible that some expressions can be
more namelike with respect to one set of contrasting alternatives and more
description-like with respect to another set.
Names and descriptions cannot be defined in terms of their form because
there are counter-instances for both. Consequently it seems better to try
to define them in terms of their relationships to the kinds of entities they
signify. But this relationship, as we have seen, turns out to be largely
a pragmatic affair, sometimes to individuals, sometimes to predicates and
even sometimes to both. Further, although the purpose of distinguishing
proper names from general terms is to assist in this kind of analysis, it
seems that the distinctions we have made apply equally well to general terms.
Thus, the noun-phrase "the ostrich" in (20) behaves just like a proper name
with respect to the analysis we have given.
(20) The ostrich buries its head in the sand.
Compare the direct use of "The ostrich" with the indirect use of the definite
description in (21).
(21) The fastest running bird in the world buries its head
in the sand.
- 19 -
Ordinary language is replete with descriptive phrases which, in prin-
ciple, could be replaced by more name-like expressions, even though those
expressions are not always what could be called proper names. People
actually say things like (22).
(22) My wife bought our pet poodle in my home town during our
summer vacation.
From a logical point of view they could have said something like (23)
(23) Mary bought Molly in Paris on Thursday, 28th of April.
but probably not from a pragmatic point of view. Indeed, that is why
Donnellan's account is not a fully pragmatic account, for he does not dis-
tinguish between what could be said and what would be said. At the trial
of Jones for the murder of Smith, it is true that one could say (24)
(24) Smith's murderer is insane.
and it is true that the definite description "Smith's murderer" could be
used directly or indirectly in the same sentence used on different occasions,
but it would not be said. In a situation, such as a trial, where the par-
ticular identity of "Smith's murderer" is up for grabs, the referential
use of "Smith's murderer" would be most improbable. If the man in the dock
behaves oddly, we would refer to him as "the prisoner," or "the man in the
dock" or just, simply, "Jones."
Speakers rarely select the words they do arbitrarily. Our theories
about language cannot ignore this fact; our intuitions would perhaps be more
valuable channeled into probable utterances rather than possible ones.
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What is possible is simply too inclusive, even though what is probable may
be too speculative. We should never loose sight of the fact that speakers
very often have reasons for choosing the expressions they do. Studying
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